Aid against the Dutch requested
Sire:
Hernando de los Rios Coronel, procurator-general of the Filipinas Islands and of all their estates, declares that he came the past year to inform your Majesty and your royal Council of the Indias, in the name of those islands, of the desperate condition to which the Dutch enemy have brought them. Desiring that your Majesty understand the importance of the matter, he gave you a long printed relation in which he discussed points important for their recovery from the enemy and the expulsion of the latter from that archipelago. Your Majesty, upon seeing it, ordered a fleet to be prepared; but that fleet was so unfortunate as to be lost before beginning its voyage. Although your Council of the Indias is discussing the formation of another fleet to sail by way of the Strait of Magallanes, or by the new strait [i.e., of Le Maire], it cannot, if it leaves here any time in July (which is the earliest time when it can be sent from España) possibly arrive [at Filipinas] until one and one-half years from now—or a little less, if it has no bad luck. Now considering the watchfulness of the enemy, and the forces that they [26]are sending this year, namely, forty ships, which have left Olanda—whence can be inferred the importance to them of making themselves masters of those regions, since they are so persistent in their efforts, and incur so heavy expenses—he [i.e., Los Rios] advises you for the discharge of his conscience, and his obligation, and his duty as a good vassal of your Majesty, that there is urgent need that, notwithstanding the relief that your Council of the Indias is about to despatch by way of the straits, other help be furnished from Nueva España and Piru; of both men and money, and to employ this [aid from España] with as great care as the gravity of the matter requires, and to realize the fact that, were it lost, both Eastern and Western India would be endangered. They would be in great danger, as would also these kingdoms; for it would mean to permit the enemy to become so powerful and so rich as all know who are aware of the wealth of those regions. Besides, it would mean the extinction of whatever Christian element is there, and would shut the doors to the preaching of the gospel, which your Majesty and your ancestors have procured with so great glory and so many expenses. [That relief of Nueva España and Piru should be prepared] also, for if the relief [from España] should suffer an equal disaster with the last, and that country could not be succored, it would all be lost.
I petition your Majesty to order that this matter be considered, as a matter of so great importance; and that your president of the Indias call a conference of those most experienced in the Indias, so that they may discuss what measures can be taken most fitting for the relief of that country, and as speedily [27]as possible, where he [i.e., Los Rios] will also declare the measures that occur to him.
[Endorsed: “To the president of the Indias. Examined, in the meeting of April 7, 620.”]
Treatise on the navigation of Filipinas, reduced to four chapters Sire:
Your Majesty orders me to declare my opinion in regard to the navigation from España to the Philipinas and Malucas Islands, from them to España, the mutual navigation between those island groups; and the seasons suitable for such navigation. In obedience to your royal order, I declare, Sire, that the propositions cover four principal points, each of which I shall explain in order. [The original document contains a marginal abstract of each of the four points that follow; but these abstracts are here omitted.]
First point. This point contains in brief the substance of all the others. In explaining it, I declare that the navigations from these kingdoms to those islands are so worthy of consideration, and so important, that no others in the world at this time are equal to them. For the drugs, fragrant gums, spices, precious stones, and silks that the Dutch enemy and their allies bring thence—obtained partly by pillaging, and partly by trading in their forts and factories which they own throughout that archipelago—amount, as they do at present, to five millions [of pesos] annually. It has been stated how paramount is this undertaking to any others that can today be attempted; for besides the spiritual injury inflicted by those heretical pirates among all that multitude [28][of heathen peoples] (which I think the universal Master has delivered to your Majesty so that you may cultivate it and cleanse it for His celestial granaries), it is quite certain—since the enemy are collecting annually so large a mass of wealth; and since the sinews of war consist in that, both for attack and defense—that they are acquiring and will continue to acquire those riches daily, with greater forces. And, as they continue to increase in strength, their ambitious designs will also extend further. In the same degree as the enemy grows stronger, it is certain that our forces will continue to decrease—and so much that, if relief does not arrive there in time, the day will come in which not one of your Majesty’s vessels can be placed on the sea, because of the many that the enemy will have there. Inasmuch as there is no one in the world today who can oppose the enemy except your Majesty, they hate our interests with all their strength, and will attempt to destroy and ruin them by all possible methods.
The method of preventing all those most considerable troubles is the one that your Majesty is attempting, by despatching the eight vessels that you are sending under color of reënforcements—and would that it had been with a fleet of sixteen vessels, each one of which would carry three hundred sailors and soldiers and be very well armed with artillery. For with that the rest [of the enemy’s forces] would be driven away, and that crowd of thieves, who are becoming arrogant and enriching themselves—so much to the cost of our holy religion, of your Majesty’s reputation and prestige, and of your most loyal vassals, by disturbing your Majesty’s most holy designs—would be forced from those seas and even from these. [29]For it is very certain that if that [trade] be taken away, the enemy would have no resources with which they could preserve themselves; while if your Majesty has all that profit—as beyond doubt, God helping (for whose honor it is being done), you will have it, by encouraging your royal forces and by enforcing your holy purposes—all the heads of that many-headed serpent of the enemy will be destroyed.
Inasmuch as it is proper for us who, like myself, are zealous for your royal service, let us hasten on that service, by as many roads as God makes known to us. I declare, Sire, that in order to encourage those most loyal though most afflicted vassals whom your Majesty has now in Manila, it is advisable for the present reënforcement to be sent; and that its route be by the shortest path and the one of least risk—namely, by way of the Cape of Buena Esperança; not only is the weather more favorable in that route, but it passes through less longitude.
I mention the weather, for from this time on the weather is favorable, as was determined in a general council of experienced pilots of all nations that was held at Manila by Governor Don Juan de Silva. [I mention] also the longitude, because the time taken to go by the above route is known—namely (to one who follows his course without making fruitless stops) seven months; which, counted from the first of December, places the arrival there at the end of June.
Some one may object to all this by saying that the intention is to import this relief into Manila, so that all that region may not be lost; and that, if it shall go by that route [i.e., of the Cape], it runs the risk of meeting the enemy and of being lost, and incidentally [30]that all that region [of Filipinas] will remain in its present danger, and even greater, because of your Majesty’s resources being wasted, and the necessity of getting together a new relief expedition—but [such objector would say], if this relief be sent by another route all those troubles will be obviated and the purpose attained. I answer that objection by saying: First, that eight vessels are not so weak a force that they should fear those of the enemy who, on their homeward trip—inasmuch as they do not fear along that route any encounter that will harm them—come laden with their goods, in great security, and carelessly; and they have at best only two or three galleons, while our eight galleys, ready and prepared for fighting, not only have nothing to fear, but can from the start expect the victory, in case they meet the enemy. Second, for this reason, if once our galleons cause the enemy loss in the chief thing that takes the latter there, namely, trade, they will have to diminish their forces, and will lose credit with their backers. Hence I infer that not only should this route and [possible] encounter not be avoided, but that express orders be given to the commander of this relief expedition to follow the routes taken by the enemy and to reconnoiter their chief factory of Batan, which is not fortified. For if God permits him to find and destroy that place, many and very important results will follow: First, that immediately word will be passed to all those nations—who love changes and cry “long live” to the conqueror—and they will lose the little affection that they have for the enemy at present; while they will incline toward and join us, turning against our enemy, as they have promised. Second, that our soldiers, [31]flushed with the beginnings of victory, will be worth after that for other victories just twice as much; nor will they be without military discipline for the first victory, for the Spanish infantry begins its military duty from the day when it establishes its camp, and daily becomes more valuable. Third, inasmuch as when the vessels of this relief expedition reach Manila, they will necessarily arrive there in need of rest, and already the enemy will be warned to resist whatever sally they try to make, that which will now be made against them with eight vessels cannot later be made against them with many more. Fourth, because, on the journey they will lay down the complete and fixed route that should be taken by that course, so that your Majesty’s fleets may go and come as do those of the enemy. Fifth, because the enemy are at present not only not sending any fleet to those regions, but are obliged to collect their forces in order to resist those of your Majesty in their own territory, because of the expiration of the truce.1 Consequently the attempt must be made to inflict all the damage possible on the enemy during these years, until they are driven entirely out of the Orient and your Majesty becomes lord of it all. For if that result be once accomplished, the fruits of that victory will allow sufficient fleets to be maintained, both in these seas and in those, for the defense and conservation of that region and much more. Moreover, in order to check the enemy and to remove completely from their eyes this illusion that has given and gives them so strong a belief that your Majesty’s forces are exhausted by the large sums that you have spent in [32]protecting our holy religion, I declare, Sire, that an effective plan occurs to me whereby this matter may be concluded without the expense of one single maravedi from your royal treasury. This is, that loans be asked from the rich and wealthy persons in the provinces of Nueva España and Peru (for there are many such), until you have two millions [of pesos]. Your Majesty can prepare a large fleet with that sum, and will finish with the enemy once for all. The vassals of those kingdoms will give that loan cheerfully if you ask it, proportioning to each one the amount in accordance with what he can give without inconveniencing himself. For they are also greatly interested in this matter; and the payment will be easily made, if the result be thus attained. With that money, it would be best to go to Yndia to build the fleet; for there it can be built better and at a less cost than anywhere else.
Second point. In order to return from those islands to España, it will be advisable to come but lightly laden, and well provided with arms, in order to withstand any encounter with the enemy; and that they follow the same route that is taken by the Dutch, or by the fleets of Portugal, for by no other route can the voyage be made so quickly as by that route—considering that, if one wishes to come by way of Nueva España (which is the shortest course except that by the Cape of Buena Esperança), the voyage from Manila to Acapulco will last five or six months, even with favorable weather. Arrived there it is necessary to cross from one sea to the other over one hundred and sixty leguas of very bad road, and then to sail for another three months before reaching España; and the vessels must wait from January, the time [33]when they arrive from Philipinas, until June, when they embark for España. In all more than thirteen months will be spent in the voyage. In case that one should prefer to come not by way of Nueva España, but by the Strait of Magallanes or that of Mayre, the delay is equal or greater, and the food will of necessity spoil and the men die; for the food of Manila, as that is a hot country, very soon spoils and rots.
Third point. The voyages from Manila to Terrenate are three hundred leguas, or a trifle more or less; and those from Manila to Malaca a trifle more than four hundred.
Fourth point. The seasons required for those voyages are as follows: To go from España to Philippinas it is advisable to sail from España after the sun passes the equator in the direction of the Tropic of Capricorn, namely, from September twenty-third on; for, since one must mount to thirty-five degrees of latitude in the southern hemisphere, it is advisable to be in that hemisphere when the sun by its presence has put to flight the furies of the winds of those seas, since even with that care that Cape of Buena Esperança bears the reputation of a stormy headland: In order to return, one would better, for the same reasons, sail from Manila during the time when the sun is still in the southern hemisphere, if he has to double the Cape.
The suitable time to sail from Manila to Terrenate is when the winds in those seas are blowing from the north (because Manila lies almost due north of Terrenate), namely, during November and December. The same season is suitable to sail to Malaca, as Manila lies almost due northeast of Malaca. For that [34]voyage the brisas that set in in January are also favorable. The return trips from Maluco and Malaca to Manila are during the season of the winds from the south and the vendavals, which generally begin, the winds from the south by the middle of May on, and the vendavals during June, July, and August, etc.
I petition your Majesty to deign to honor this humble service as such, by the benignity of your royal sight, so that I may gain strength to serve you to the measure of my desires.
[Endorsed: “Juan de Sigura Manrrique. Have each point abstracted, so that it may be attended to in the Council.” In another hand: “Abstracted.” “Examined.”][35]
1 The twelve-year truce between the States-General and Spain, signed in 1608.
Letter from Francisco de Otaço, S.J., to Father Alonso de Escovar
I have been urging Father Figueroa about that grant of money.
He always replies with regret that other measures must first be taken in Sevilla, as he has written to your Reverence.
Your Reverence recently told me that they will charge to that poor province the 400 ducados for provisioning the fathers.
Your Reverence may be assured that I cannot permit the departure in the fleet, if the cost is to be charged in this way.
I supposed that the going of Father Bilbao and his companions would be at the expense of his Majesty, as it has always been.
I am now writing to Father Simon Cota that I have received that amount from your Reverence; and although by means of your order I have paid the debt already contracted, and have also funds to defray immediate expenses that cannot be avoided, yet, for the needs that are certain to arise in the future, I shall require help to the amount of more than two thousand reals, because it is better that I should have too much than too little. And things are so expensive in all this country of Spain, that to collect and convey the fathers to Sevilla will cost even more than the sum I estimate. Your Reverence will kindly send the amount to me at the time and in the manner most convenient.
Sad was the news that yesterday came to this court concerning the loss of our fleet, and such has been the grief that I do not know how to describe it to your Reverence.
The president wept like a child, more especially because, to make this news worse, other bad news came from Flandes at the same time; this information was that the Hollander was setting out, or had already set out, with his 25 galleons.
The president himself told this.
He already considers our possessions in Philippinas and Indias as lost; for it seems as if courage has deserted these men, and that no means for further aid remain.
May God our Lord forbid this, and encourage them, in order that they may take heart in this difficulty, that valor and fortitude may be shown in the cause of God our Lord and of the king, and that the enemy may not prevail. There is no lack of people who are already encouraged, and are seeking remedies and forming plans. Your Reverence will kindly inform [37]me of such plans as may occur to you, for those who are trying to give courage in this emergency desire light on all projects.
The loss of our fleet is known here only in a general way. Your Reverence will please give me all the particulars, and inform me whether our Lord took our fathers unto Himself, which we much fear from the reports.
Still, because their death has not been verified or related in detail, the masses which should be said in this province for Father Bilbao, in the other two provinces for their two fathers, and in the province of Philippinas for all three, have not been ordered. I, for my part, have many to say for them if dead—or if alive, in case our Lord has spared them. It has also been said that the cargo of the flagship floated ashore. I hope that our boxes of books which were in it were spared, for, so far as such things are concerned, I feel the loss of them greatly, although their loss is not to be mentioned in connection with that of our fathers. If the Divine Majesty has chosen to inflict this heavy blow upon us, supra modu, sed domini sumos et iustos est et rectu iudiciu eius.2 Such a fleet, and so well adapted for the grand service of God! And those three apostolic men, going with such zeal—if in such a cause, they have already ended in a death resembling martyrdom, blessed be the Lord! From here the authorities [38]sent some person, I know not whom, as comissary to recover what was lost from the flagship which ran ashore. Your Reverence, being near, will know whether any particular measure is necessary for our interests, etc.
When your Reverence remits the money spoken of above, do not send it through our Father Figueroa. For, although he assures me that the last order is good, since it has been acknowledged, yet he asks for forty days’ time, which is very long.
I say this because to your Reverence I may speak freely and confidentially, for you know the good father. I have already determined not to trouble Father Figueroa about my own money, because I drew it for my private expenses, and it must be used in this way only, as I told him before I went to Rome. He now charges to me items of expense not conformable to this arrangement, although justified from his standpoint—for the good father is a saint and most faithful in everything, though not very prompt or skilful in accounts and correspondence, as is well known. Because I have written at length, and more especially because I am so disturbed by grief at the news, I close this letter to your Reverence. May God guard your Reverence as I desire.
The [word illegible in MS.] procrastinate here, and indicate that we are bound to have contests and wrangling with our fathers, wherefore there is much to fear lest they delay me, and frustrate my plans to go with a few [religious]. Now, too, with what has befallen the fleet, I think that these lords must perforce undertake the preparation of another large one, to go via the Strait, and that people there will desire us to come. I am prudent and on the lookout, [39]and will promptly inform your Reverence of everything; for to you I always look for advice, light, and strong support in the Father. Madrid, January 14, 1620.
Francisco de Otaço[40]
1 This squadron was sent for the succor of the Philippines, in December, 1619; but soon after its departure it encountered a severe storm, which compelled the ships to take refuge in the port of Cadiz. Learning of this, the royal Council sent imperative orders for the ships to depart on their voyage; the result was that they were driven ashore and lost on the Andalusian coast, January 3, 1620, with the loss of one hundred and fifty lives. Among the dead was Fray Hernando de Moraga, O.S.F., who had come to Spain some time before to ask aid for the Philippine colony and the missions there. A council assembled by the king, after discussing the matter, recommended that Spain abandon the islands as costly and profitless; Moraga’s entreaties induced the king to disregard this advice, and to send a fleet with troops and [29n]supplies, in which embarked Moraga with thirty friars of his order. See La Concepción’s account, in Hist. de Philipinas, v, pp. 474–479.
Another letter from Otaço, dated February 18, 1620, says: “There has been a very heated discussion (which still continues) regarding aid for the Philipinas, between the lords of the Council and all the procurators and agents of those islands.”