Chapter VII. Of the government of Don Juan de Silva, and events with the Dutch.
On the death of Don Pedro de Acuña in the year 1606, your Majesty sent Don Juan de Silva to govern.
Upon his arrival at that kingdom, he was given [200]an opportunity to put his wishes into effect. A Dutchman arrived there with four ships and one patache, and, having stationed himself at the entrance of the bay of Manila, remained there six months, capturing and pillaging all who came to the city. Don Juan de Silva had no ships ready to go out to drive the Dutch from that port; but, with the stay of the enemy, he set to work to repair four ships that were there, and to finish another that was being built in a shipyard. He made haste, and used the iron gratings from the houses of the citizens for the nails that he needed, which the people gave willingly, as well as whatever else was necessary. Further, he also cast five large pieces of artillery, with which, and with the artillery in the forts, he made ready and equipped five ships with high free-board, and three galleys, and manned them with the most valiant of the soldiers and citizens, among all of them more than one thousand men being Spaniards alone. He found the enemy very careless, his ships filled with wealth from many rich vessels that they had pillaged, belonging to the Chinese which were coming to Manila, laden with the merchandise that came yearly. He found only three ships, and attacking and grappling with one of them, it was blown up because of a fire that unfortunately caught. The other two surrendered, although the victory was not bought cheaply, for many people were killed. It had been stated two months before that that victory would be gained on St. Mark’s day,8 as happened, and, as he recounted one night, had been told to him. But who would say that that victory was to begin his perdition, and so many troubles as I shall relate?[201]
Don Juan de Silva was made very rich by that victory, for the fifth of the booty which your Majesty conceded to him was worth more than two hundred thousand pesos, as I learned from his own mouth. Besides that, the victory induced in him thoughts for great undertakings, and he did not stop to compare the wealth of that kingdom with his designs. He discussed building a fleet to go to Terrenate, and put the matter into execution. Although he was greatly opposed by the entire city—and especially by the royal Audiencia and royal officials, who judged from their experience that the plan was not advisable—yet he acted in defiance of them, and left Manila with his fleet, leaving the natives grievously burdened with taxes, your Majesty’s treasury indebted to a vast amount, and the city without artillery. He went to Maluco, and not only did he not accomplish any good result, but he even returned with little reputation derived from that expedition, as all had foretold.
He desired to correct that mischief, and determined, without any one’s counsel, to build seven galleons, which, with the three that he had, would make ten in all, and also six galleys. That was an undertaking disproportionate to the possibility of his forces, and innumerable evils resulted from it, just as they generally result to him who does not proportion means to ends, and who does not measure desires with strength. When he fought at Playa Honda with the Dutch, as he grappled he recognized the advantage that the larger ships had over the others. Consequently, he determined to build his ships so large that they should be superior to any ship that the enemy would bring. For that purpose [202]he made them of one thousand, one thousand five hundred, and nearly two thousand toneladas. He began to make arrangements for putting his desire into execution, and at the same time to write to the viceroy of India to send him ten more galleons and six galleys, so that the forces of both governments being united, they might at the same time complete the expulsion of the Dutch from the archipelago and seize their forts and factories. That idea would have been very commendable, and the most efficacious means of all, if he could have carried it out as he conceived it. I believe that, in order to facilitate that, he wrote to your Majesty, whereupon this court was filled with hopes. But to place it in execution, he had as much foundation as will be seen here. The forces of India are so few, that, although Silva was told that the viceroy could not send him six ships—and those that could go would be poorly equipped; and that if he did send them, the coasts of India would be left unprotected, which were daily being infested; and, besides, that they knew by experience—the little love that the Portuguese bear to the Castilians and that he should not trust in them—still by sending money to build galleons and for the men, of which at least one-half million [pesos] would be necessary, the viceroy would send that fleet. Don Juan de Silva was without funds; on the contrary, the royal treasury was deeply in debt from the expedition to Maluco. Still, in order to forward his designs, he sent his master-of-camp, Christoval de Azqueta, with pledges and securities made out by the royal officials, binding your Majesty’s royal treasury in order to get the money there from merchandise, and paying interest on them—a transaction [203]which was considered ridiculous to those who knew India. He gave the master-of-camp sixteen thousand pesos which he borrowed in gold from the inhabitants of Manila, in order that he might bring back some necessary things. The master-of-camp sailed in a ship accompanied by forty Spaniards to indicate his authority. As yet, not one of them has been seen; and it is considered certain that all were drowned, since no further news has been heard of them. On the other hand, Silva wrote to the viceroy of Nueva España that he was building that fleet, and requested money, men, and ammunition from him. He despatched so late the ships, which had arrived on time, that although the viceroy made his utmost exertions he could not perform the friendly offices that Silva desired.
He began to place the said galleons on the stocks, and, as they were so large, scarcely could he find the necessary timbers in the forest. Consequently, he had to have them sought under great difficulties, and by penetrating the thicker recesses of the woods. There having found them, it was necessary, in order to drag and carry them to the shipyard, to depopulate the surrounding villages of the Indians, and to drag the timbers with immense labor, hardship, and cost to the Indians. The masts of one galleon cost the Indians, as is affirmed by the religious of St. Francis, and as I heard declared by the alcalde-mayor of the province where they were cut—namely, La Laguna de Bay—the labor of six thousand Indians for three months to drag them over very rough mountains. They were paid by the villages at the rate of forty reals per month apiece, but were given nothing to eat, and therefore, the wretched Indian [204]had to look for food. I shall not relate the cruel and inhuman treatment of the agents, and the many Indians who died in the forest. Had those galleons been of moderate size, and twice as many, they would not have cost one-half as much. Neither shall I tell your Majesty of the Indians who were hanged, those who deserted their wives and children and fled exhausted to the mountains, and those sold as slaves to pay the taxes imposed on them; the scandal to the gospel, and the so irreparable wrongs caused by that shipbuilding; and with how great inhumanity they passed sentence on and executed on the poor Indian not only what was necessary, but also what the lawless greed of agents took from him. In short, the hardships, injuries, and harm inflicted upon the Indians were vast, and there was no remedy for it. And hence those ships had so disastrous an end; for all were wrecked in a storm, and all those in them were drowned forty leguas from the city—divine permission, which is so offended at injuries done to the poor, exacting those lives in order to make reparation for such wrongs. Now more than one million [pesos] is due to the Indians and there is no hope of recompense. From that may be inferred how great should be the trustworthiness and Christian spirit of those persons who are to govern the Filipinas, since they have no one to restrain them for the injuries that they commit. Besides the said wrongs, those that I shall now relate were no less.
When he discussed building those ships, three years before that fleet should be taken out, he ordered all the soldiers of the islands to be collected, and the forts and important posts to be abandoned, especially a fort in the city of Cibu. He took all the artillery [205]and carried it to Manila, which was the cause of the Mindanaos destroying those islands when they learned that, without any one opposing them. He also ordered that no one leave the city without his permission, under serve penalties. On the one hand, he kept the men there desperate, who could not go out to find food; and on the other, gave them nothing. Therefore, many men fled through those surrounding kingdoms. And, when he most needed sailors, more than two hundred of them fled because of ill treatment and because they were deprived of one-half their rations. He imposed many taxes upon the Indians, with great oppression to them on account of the food that was ruined because it was not needed so early. As a result, he brought the country to the extreme of poverty, even worse than if the enemy had sacked it.
On the other hand he sent to Japon for metals with which to cast artillery, and for saltpeter for powder; and they brought him what he had sent to ask. In two years he cast one hundred and fifty large pieces of artillery; but he had no master who understood it, and consequently the pieces were so poorly made that none of them stood the test. I saw twenty pieces out of thirty-six burst at the first shot, as the gunner, one Pedro Castaño, who is in this court, will tell; consequently they did not dare to test the cannon with the royal test. There was an excellent founder there, named Don Diego de Prado, who had made considerable artillery in Lisboa. Silva refused to accept him, but on the contrary let him go to España by way of India, although he should have diligently looked for him. He is a friar here now, named Basilio. They were unable to get a piece [206]that could be used, although they tried in various ways. They continued these efforts until certain Japanese built some ovens, in their own fashion, and made some bellows which forced in a great quantity of air. Those produced better artillery, although some of these pieces also burst, for they did not hit upon the alloy of copper in accordance with its quality.
Don Juan de Silva persisted in his intentions; and, seeing after two years had passed that the master-of-camp Azqueta had not arrived, and that it must be believed that he had been drowned, he sent a father rector of the Society of Jesus, named Juan de Ribera,9 and Captain Don Diego de Miranda, a Portuguese, to Goa, so that, in his name, they might ask the viceroy for the said galleons; and they did so. Although with great objection and opposition from the city of Goa, the viceroy gave them four galleons and four galliots, with very few and badly disciplined crews. What took place in India in regard to that matter is a pity. Your Majesty needs to make many reforms there, because of the danger of losing that country through the poor discipline of the soldiers, as they themselves confess, and warning of this has been given in many memorials.
They started for Manila, and arrived at Malaca and at the Strait late and in bad weather. The commander did not dare pass on, although he was urged and pressed to do so by the rector of the Society. Matters came to such a pass that the commander told the father that he would put him below decks, and the soldiers tried to kill him, for they said that he was going to drown them. Thereupon they remained, [207]and returned to Malaca, advising Don Juan de Silva that they were there awaiting his order.
Don Juan de Silva learned the news of the galleons and determined to send a patache to Macan, and as its commander, Pilot Juan Gallegos, in order to purchase some ammunition and to go thence to Malaca. He ordered the four galleons to await him in the Strait, saying that he had resolved to pass there, and that all would go together to attack the factory of Xava, the chief factory of the enemy, which had no fortress; thence they would go to Banda and to Maluco. That would have been a very suitable idea if it could have been executed during the season for navigation. Juan Gallegos went to Macan, and thence to the Strait of Cincapura, where he found six Dutch galleons and one patache. They seized him, and learned from him of the coming of Don Juan de Silva with so large a force. They did not dare await the latter and so left the Strait. Shortly after Don Juan de Silva arrived, two ships of Goa came from China with the goods and merchandise from India, which it was our Lord’s will to save in that way.
Before the enemy happened to seize the patache of Juan Gallegos, they had negotiated with the king of Hachen, a country located in the island of Samatra, near the Strait, in regard to uniting with them to attack Malaca with more than four hundred craft, that would hold more than forty thousand men. That king fought with the galleons, and his presence there was of great importance. He burned one galleon, but returned without accomplishing any other exploit, although he carried a quantity of large artillery. After the king had gone, the Dutch arrived. [208]What they did was to burn the three remaining galleons in the river of Malaca. Then they went to the Strait, where they captured Juan Gallegos, as above stated. The Portuguese gained little reputation—or to say better, lost much—in not defending themselves. But since it is not my intention to meddle with another jurisdiction, I shall not discuss that.
Don Juan de Silva left Manila with ten galleons—larger than have been seen in Europa—and four galleys, on February 28, 1616. He laid his course toward the Strait, as he thought that he would find there the four galleys from Goa, in accordance with the order that he had sent. He learned what had happened in the Strait; and although he might have gone to Bantan, in Xava Major, to avenge the injury, since he might expect to find the enemy there—and he might at least have destroyed that factory and exacted satisfaction for what had been done—he did not choose to do so, but left the galleons anchored in the Strait, while he went to Malaca with the galleys. There he was received under the pall with great solemnity, honored with great festivities, and called that city’s savior, since the ships had taken flight because of his coming. Don Juan became sorely perplexed, and could not come to a decision as to whether to careen his vessels and wait until the following year for the viceroy of Goa, or whether to return to Manila. Death overtook him in that perplexity, on April 19 of the same year.
He left orders for the fleet to return to Manila, and to convey thither his embalmed body. Thereupon our fleet returned. It was in as bad shape as if it had been a year at sea; for at that part of the Strait where it was anchored the air was so unhealthful [209]and the water so poisonous that the soldiers began to sicken immediately, and to die swollen up and yellow; and some days forty or fifty of them were thrown into the sea. All asserted that had they remained there one fortnight longer, not enough men would have been left to manage the sails, nor could they have brought back the galleons—which returned without anchors, for the few that they carried were lost in the currents, which are very strong. And had they not found nineteen anchors, which they bought, they would have perished.
Chapter VIII. Of the opposition to Don Juan de Silva from all the city, and the opportunity that he lost by not taking the advice that they gave him. Strange are the judgments of the Most High, and nothing happens by chance that His infinite providence does not register. The Portuguese regarded as certain the coming of Don Juan de Silva to the Strait with his fleet, and attributed to him, as was evident, the saving of their possessions. But he who regards the opportunity that Silva lost, and how much more important it would have been not to have left Manila, but to have been there when the enemy (who passed through the Strait of Magallanes) arrived, will see how unsatisfactory was the Malaca expedition.
Don Juan de Silva had already prepared his fleet, and his yards were already squared, when a discussion arose as to whether it was advisable for him to go in search of the enemy, for which purpose he had prepared it. A general meeting of ecclesiastical and secular cabildos, the bishop, and the orders, was called, together with the royal Audiencia. Silva [210]made them a harangue, and showed a royal decree that he had received shortly before, in which it was ordered that he should make the expedition. He read what was most suitable to his purpose, whereupon Doctor Vega, your auditor, asked him to give it to the secretary to read publicly, as they wished to know its contents. It was read, and your Majesty ordered in it that the viceroy of India be advised, so that both should join forces and go in pursuit of the enemy with their fleets, and that the viceroy should act as superior officer if he came in person. From this, they took occasion to oppose Silva, and said that he was not obeying your Majesty’s orders. They reminded him that he did not have sailors, because while the fewest number of sailors necessary for ten galleys amounted to fifty, he did not have twelve effective ones, because they had fled, as above stated.
Item: That he was only carrying two iron anchors for each galleon, disproportionate to their size, besides two others of wood, which are called cenepites; and that he was going into seas with strong currents and shoals, where he had to anchor every day, with evident peril and known danger of losing his fleet.
Item: That he was not carrying suitable rigging or sails. At the same time they told him that he was leaving the city depopulated of the men who might defend it in any sudden need.
Item: That he had dismantled the forts and walls of artillery, and had left no good piece, contrary to the ordinances of your Majesty, and to all good government.
Item: That it was easy for the enemy, knowing [211]the route that he was taking, to attack the city, which was surrounded by more than fifteen thousand Chinese, and a considerable number of Japanese, all of whom were angered by the many annoyances and injuries that they had received; especially the natives, of whom it could be feared that they would revolt at any news of an enemy, and what would most encourage them would be to see the city without defenders or artillery.
Item: That he was taking a route very foolishly chosen, because the season and monsoon (as it is called) for seeking the enemy was already past; and he was going with a known risk of suffering shipwreck, or of accomplishing nothing.
Item: That it was advisable for him to inform the viceroy of his expedition, as your Majesty ordered, and in the meanwhile to continue to provide himself with everything necessary. The following year he could leave, as was advisable and as your Majesty ordered. In short, they reminded him of many other difficulties; but none of them were able to make him postpone his purpose. Doctor Vega gave him a memorial which is printed, in which he declares all the above and many other arguments; and the fiscal issued many injunctions and protests against him. They became so angered that he tried to arrest the fiscal, who absented himself, together with many influential persons. The city was very much in danger of being lost, and was divided into factions and different opinions; although it is true that all desired Silva’s absence. After so many difficulties, and after having defied them all, Silva left the city with his fleet, leaving the walls dismantled, as above stated. When he embarked, many men of [212]those that he had provided from the inhabitants of the city, and single men, were not to be found, for they had run away.
Scarcely had he left Manila when news came that a Dutchman with five ships was coming, and within one week he came to anchor at the mouth of the bay of Manila. It was our Lord’s pleasure that the Dutch did not learn the city’s condition, which would have placed us in the greatest embarrassment and danger. The Dutch remained there one fortnight, and then, learning that Don Juan had gone toward their forts and factories, they set out for them. In the opinion of all it was the greatest misfortune that the news had not arrived sooner, so that our fleet could have gone to meet it; for not a single ship would have escaped; and, had he followed them to Maluco, he would have destroyed their forces without difficulty—as Don Geronimo de Silva, his cousin, wrote to him, whose letter I have. I heard afterward from the same man that he had made a treaty with all of them to surrender their forts to him if Don Juan arrived. God did not so ordain it, for our sins or for His secret judgments. So great an opportunity, which might have ended the war, was lost, for all the natives were resolved to become our friends; for they always cry “long live the conqueror!” Sections 1, 9, and 15 of Don Geronimo’s letter are of the following tenor.
Letter of Don Geronimo de Silva, Governor of Maluco I am replying to the duplicate of your Lordship, which I received by the hand of Captain Juan Cutirez Paramo and Sargento-mayor Don Pedro [213]Tellez, dated at the Strait of Sincapura, March 15, in which your Lordship gives me advice of the resolution that you took in Manila to make your voyage to Malaca, expecting to find there the viceroy of India, or at least the squadron of galleons from that state—a thing as generally desired by all as it is deemed difficult by me. For I could never persuade myself that the viceroy of India would decide to send a larger fleet this year than the four galleons; and, supposing this, I would have been glad had your Lordship not gone in search of the viceroy this year. For, as I understand the decree of his Majesty, the preparations were for the coming year; and by that time matters would have been suitably arranged, and, both powers having united, his Majesty’s will would have been realized, without the possibility of any fears of danger. But if the resolution taken by your Lordship to go out with your fleet, because of the great expenses incurred, had been taken then to come to employ that fleet here, it would have arrived at so good a season and opportunity, that all these islands would have surrendered to you. I could answer with my head that his Majesty would possess them without your Lordship’s needing to fire a single shot, for the material for this truth was very well arranged. I alone was unfortunate in that your Lordship did not come directly here when you left Manila. I would give you as a witness of that the king of Tidore, only he cannot declare it in writing; but he will be a witness on that day that our Lord brings your Lordship to these islands.
Your Lordship orders me at present to despatch to you what galleys are here. In fulfilment of that order Don Pedro Tellez is returning in the galley [214]that brought him, for Captain Juan de Guassa’s galley was such that it could not be repaired at all, although I summoned the royal officials, and persons who understood it, to examine it. To my summons they replied that it absolutely had nothing of use on it but the nails; accordingly, with their advice, it was beached. I have only the galliot left here and that is as free from iron and rigging as the galleys here have always been. The galliot is the feet and hands of these islands, and that which serves as a caracoa; for, glory be to God, the Meldicas [sic; sc. mestizos] and native Christians are wanting to me. The reason that moves me to this will be told your Lordship by Don Pedro Tellez, whom I wished to make a witness of this unfortunate state of affairs, and of what the service of his Majesty suffers.
Will your Lordship advise me of your resolution to come to these forts, and whether the viceroy of India is coming now with the squadron that your Lordship has built. What I can say is that your Lordship’s speedy arrival here matters so much, although it be with only your galleys, that on that alone depends the restoration of these two islands, which will be maintained with the hope that your Lordship will come hither in the time above stated. If you do not come, the islands and the Spaniards who inhabit them will certainly perish; for although the king of Tidore is our friend, he is the only one, and he does not have the same assurance of his island as hitherto. For that reason, it is advisable for me always to keep in this island the greater part of the infantry of this camp, divided among the fort of Santiago, the fort of Principe Tomanira, and Socanora. From the above your [215]Lordship will infer that I have need of protecting myself not only from the Dutch but also from the natives and our intimates; for things are very much changed from what your Lordship is informed. Tidore, July 29, 1616.
Don Geronimo de Silva