Chapter IX.

The coming of the Dutch to Manila in search of Don Juan de Silva.

It was learned in Maluco from the Dutch commander who passed through the Strait of Magallanes and infested the coasts of Piru and Nueva España—the same one who arrived at Manila just after the departure of Don Juan de Silva—that Don Juan had laid his course toward Malaca and thence to Maluco. Immediately all their ships were collected, and, repairing many, they equipped the ten best ones, taking the best artillery and men from their forts for that purpose, with the determination of awaiting Silva. But when they saw that he delayed so long, and that he could not come to Maluco now, because of bad weather, thinking that he would have returned, they went to try issues with him at Manila. On reaching the island of Mindanao, they learned of his death from the Indians. They made a compact with the latter that each side should go to destroy the islands, even as far as the city of Manila. The Mindanaos set out with a fleet that they had prepared, of seventy caracoas, which resemble galliots. They anchored with them in the province of Camarines, where they had heard that one ship and two pataches were being built for your Majesty. They killed and captured about thirty Spaniards and many Indians, set fire to the ships, and pillaged whatever [216]they could lay hands on. That disaster, which was very great, was the result of neglecting to send there fifty picked soldiers to guard the shipyard. The chiefs of those caracoas divided into two parties because of disputes between them. One party went toward Manila in search of the Dutch. The other went to the island of Panay. Captain Don Diego de Quiñones, who was stationed in that island as commandant and captain of the Pintados Islands, hearing of this, sent Captain Lazaro de Torres with seven caracoas in pursuit of them; he defeated them, and captured four caracoas. The rest took to the open sea in flight, and, those vessels being small, all of the men were drowned; for no news that they have reached their country has been heard here since.

That island of Mindanao is the farthest of the Filipinas Islands, and is about twenty leguas from Cibu. That part that faces Cibu is pacified, and the Indians pay tribute, and there are a number of Christians. The entire island formerly rendered homage to your Majesty. It extends east and west, being somewhat inclined to the northeast and southwest. It is more than three hundred leguas in circumference. The southern part lies in six degrees of north latitude. It has many gold mines, as those say who have seen them, although they are but little worked, and many cinnamon trees and much civet.

Captain Estevan Rodriquez de Figueroa went to pacify it in 1596 at his own cost, with the title of governor and captain-general of the island conceded by your Majesty. But he was so unfortunate that, the first time when he set foot on land, he was killed by an Indian concealed in ambush. Captain Juan de la Xara, who was master-of-camp, continued the enterprise; [217]but as he, like his master, died, the whole enterprise was destroyed by accidents that came upon them. Consequently, not only were the natives not pacified, but more angered and desirous of vengeance. For that reason, they began to build vessels and to make inroads among those islands during the term of Don Francisco Tello, to commit depredations. They captured many Indians and their wealth (for the latter had considerable gold) through the fault of the captains and alcaldes-mayor who were governing those islands, and were not punished for it. And although punishment is one of the two arms of justice that preserves states, there has been so great lack of it in Manila, that signal injuries have thereby resulted.

The Moros became excited by those captures, and through the exercise of war they became more skilful and daring. To such a height has their boldness reached, through the carelessness and neglect of the governors, that all those islands have been destroyed and ruined. They could very well have been restrained, but the reasons why they neglected to do that cannot be explained here, because the case in hand demands that many things be passed by; but if your Majesty cares to know, I will explain them.

Those Indians [i.e., the Moros] are so vile and cowardly that they have never engaged in close combat with the Spaniards, very few of whom have dared to resist vast multitudes; yet the Moros have inflicted signal injuries. The worst is that these last few years they have committed greater ones, so that there is no Christian or friendly Indian who is safe in his house or country. These, although Indians, set forth arguments that must have shamed your Majesty’s [218]governors considerably; since, although the latter are so careful not only to collect their tributes, but to impose continually so many taxes, and to cause the Indians innumerable troubles, yet they do not defend them from their enemies. Consequently the Indians say, “Let us be free, and let us have arms, and we shall be able to defend ourselves, as we did before the advent of the Spaniards.” And, surely, did not the religious—especially those of the Society, who instruct nearly all those islands—entertain them with hopes and fair arguments, they would all have revolted, as some have done. I have related this to your Majesty so that you may order your governor to remedy that matter, which is so incumbent upon your Majesty’s royal conscience. But how poorly he informs your Majesty; since at the very moment when those people were destroying your churches, the governor wrote that they were all peaceful and quiet. It is very easy to conquer that island, if its inhabitants are made slaves, as I have said in special memorials.

Chapter X. Of the result obtained by the coming of the Dutch to the Filpinas Islands and the city of Manila. The enemy learned from the Mindanao Indians, as above stated, of the death of Don Juan de Silva, whom they had intended to go to seek. They went to the island of Panay, to a port called Yloylo, with the design of building a fort there, in order to gain possession of those islands and to get the quantity of food that was stored for the relief of Terrenate. (whence the forts of Maluco are chiefly maintained), and at the same time to make themselves [219]masters of the island. For, two years before, and during Don Juan de Silva’s term, another Dutchman had arrived at that island at a Spanish town called Arevalo, burned it, seized its provisions, made quantities of dried beef at stock farms near there, and then returned, without any one having dared to fire a shot, although there was a captain there with two hundred soldiers. Then he made a pact with the natives of the country, by which they were to render him homage.

Three or four days before the arrival of the enemy, the news reached the ears of Captain Don Diego de Quiñones, who was there with about seventy soldiers. He resolved to die there or to prevent the enemy from following out his designs. As hastily as possible, he threw up a redoubt, or small fort of fascines, stakes, and gabions, which he filled in with earth. Then having assigned his men to their positions, he awaited the enemy’s arrival. The Dutch arrived with their ten galleons and went to anchor within musket-shot of the small fort, which they began to bombard with their artillery, and with musketry to pick off those who showed themselves. But seeing that they were defending themselves, and that so great a multitude of balls could not dislodge them, they threw seven companies of infantry ashore, and assaulted the fort twice with the batteries which were free; but the infantry, getting the worst of it, had to retire. Don Diego, although shot through the thigh by a musket-ball, was encouraged; and had sent Captain Lazaro de Torres outside with forty soldiers to make an ambush. He pressed so heavily against the enemy that they had to embark hurriedly, leaving on the field and taking away [220]many dead and badly wounded, while we suffered in dead and wounded twenty or a few more. Thereupon the enemy weighed anchor and left the port in great ignominy and sorrow. That feat of arms was of great importance as can be understood from the condition of the country and of the natives of that island and others near by. I cannot keep silent on one thing that happened through the fault of him who was governing, since my intention is to make your Majesty understand the state of that kingdom. The building of a fort in that port of Yloylo, and the sending there of six pieces of artillery and one engineer to Don Diego, had been discussed in Manila. But there was the utmost remissness and neglect in sending those pieces, for it was considered certain that if the enemy came he would manage to make himself master of the port. And although they could have been sent him one month before, they reached him one week after the opportunity was gone—when, if Don Diego had had them, he would have sunk half the enemy’s fleet. Such injury is done by the remissness and neglect of him who governs.

The enemy thought that they would make little from Don Diego, and consequently left that place, and went to anchor in the mouth of the bay of Manila. They reached an island which is situated in the middle of the entrance, called Marivelez, where a sentinel is always posted to give notice of the ships that come to the city. He made signals, and hence, as we had advices, their arrival was known. They anchored their vessels at both entrances, so that no ship could enter or leave without being seen. They captured a few provision-boats, and on some days they entered the bay with two or three ships to reconnoiter [221]the port of Cabite, with the desire of having an extended view, and then returned. They had some communication with the Japanese, who, as arrogant and barbarous people, despised our fleet. Those people informed the Dutch that they had nothing to fear, for we were unable to prepare our fleet because of the lack of many things, so that they could be quite easy. Consequently they proceeded as would those who feared nothing.

Licentiate Andres de Alcaraz was then senior auditor, and was exercising the duties of captain-general. At several councils of war, it was discussed whether it would be proper to prepare the fleet that was in port, in order to drive the enemy away. Most were of the opinion that the fleet should go out, founding their opinion on the ignominy and taunts that the enemy flung upon the Spaniards, the reputation that we would lose among so many nations who were watching us, the need of provisions that the enemy were making them endure, and the design of the latter to await the ships from China in order to enrich themselves from the merchandise that the Chinese were bringing to Manila. Those vessels were to come by April, and, besides the general danger of depriving the community of the necessities brought to it by the Chinese, many of the inhabitants were interested in the said ships. Although this last could be obviated by sending advices to China, the captain-general refused to do it, although he should have done so, because of the harm that might ensue to your Majesty’s service, the common welfare, and the great harm that would result to the enemies.10 For opportunity was given [222]to the enemy to enrich themselves exceedingly with the spoils [of the Chinese], at the expense of the community; then, too, the Chinese were losing so much there by favor of their friends, since they would be ruined. The cause of that error was that, in that former year when the other Dutchman came with five vessels thinking to stay there until he pillaged the Chinese (for he bore instructions to that effect), advice was given the Chinese so that they should not come. They obeyed the advice and did not come, and as the enemy went away, the inhabitants conceived that they had signally erred, ruined the city, and deprived the royal treasury of the great sum that the duties on the merchandise brought by the Chinese would be worth. For that reason Alcaraz neglected to do that, although it was so desirable, whence so great injuries have resulted. When he who is governing heeds the murmurs that may be raised against him, and consequently neglects to take the measures that are advisable and to which he is obliged, such troubles generally follow.

Returning to the case [under consideration], almost all the city urged the preparation of the fleet, and it even came to such a pass that injunctions and protests were served on him by means of the entire ecclesiastical estate. Innumerable difficulties were represented to Licentiate Alcaraz: one that there were many repairs to make in the fleet, which had come in quite bad shape; that it even lacked considerable of its sails and rigging, and what was left was rotten; that, as no ship had come from Nueva España that year, the royal treasury was considerably in debt, and had no money with which to prepare the fleet; that for the same reason the citizens could not [223]possibly loan what was needed; that most of the artillery was under suspicion, and it was necessary to recast it; and, above all, that if it did not succeed well the entire kingdom was about to be endangered.

While affairs were in that perplexity and confusion, the vessels that had gone out laden with the goods of the kingdom returned to port; for, as they had sailed late, they could not make the voyage. That is a matter that is never remedied, although by its neglect the people are so heavily punished. They had some artillery, more than one hundred and fifty sailors, and many passengers. That was very important, and it was a fine piece of luck that the enemy did not know it, for it would have been easy to capture them; for one of those vessels had discharged its cargo about twenty leguas from the enemy and transfered its goods overland to the city. The other went to a port at a distance from there, at an island called Cibuian.

At this same time, the Mindanaos who had remained with the other squadron of caracoas came to the coast of Manila, to a village called Balayan. The Mindanaos landed, and the inhabitants fled. They set fire to the village and to more than one thousand quintals of your Majesty’s rigging, through the fault and neglect of him who was governing. For although the master-of camp, Don Juan Ronquillo, had advised them—on account of the news that had come that the Mindanaos had burned the shipyard, and were pillaging—that fifty soldiers be sent to Balayan for its defense, and because the alcalde-mayor had sent to request it, they did not do so, but postponed it from day to day; and consequently the enemy was able to destroy that place. [224]But as the inhabitants were warned, as soon as they saw the Mindanaos coming, they had a chance to get into the place of safety that was being prepared for them. Our Lord ordained that, although they set fire to the rigging, little of it was burned; for God kept it for the preparation of the fleet, without which that would have been impossible.

At the news of the coming of the Mindanaos, two galleys were sent under one commander, in order to prevent the junction of the Moros with the Dutch, and to try to scatter them. Although the Mindanaos had thirty-five caracoas, that would have been done without any danger, as caracoas are vessels which can be sunk with only the oar of a galley. He went out to look for the Mindanaos; and as he left by night, because of the proximity of the Dutch, he was not perceived, and found the Mindanaos in the best position that could be desired. The Mindanaos were intent on, and desirous of, gaining honor, for they were stationed with all their fleet within a river called Baco in the island of Mindoro. The galleys having been stationed at the mouth of the river, it was impossible for even a single caracoa to escape. Consequently when the enemy learned that the galleys were there, they were disturbed, and let go their prize, and begged the captives to intercede for them. They were determined, on seeing the galleys, to desert their caracoas, and to go inland into the forests, where not one would have escaped. But the courage to undertake the most glorious enterprise (and one of importance for all the kingdom) that could be offered was lacking; and, turning about, the galleys went to another island, under pretense that there was a heavy wind, and that they did not dare enter until [225]it ceased, in order not to run the risk of losing a galley. However that withdrawal was not without profit, for they met one of the ships that had sailed for Nueva España from Manila, which was coming back to port; and had the latter not been warned it would have fallen into the hands of the Dutch, being ignorant that they were at the mouth of the bay. Thereupon, although the wind ceased at midnight, the galleys did not return until the afternoon of next day, and were told that, just as soon as the enemy heard that they were gone, they had very joyfully taken flight toward their country, and with so great fear, that they did not even wait for one another.

One would believe that our Lord was doing everything necessary for the preparation of the fleet in order to encourage them; for at the same time came news that the two ships despatched that year from Nueva España with the goods of the city and the reënforcements sent by the viceroy both in money and in men for Maluco, had been forced to put in at Japon in July because of the vendavals; and that the almiranta had been wrecked, although the goods and men had been saved. Having awaited favorable weather there, the commander (one Don Francisco de Serna) had come, and had arrived on the coast of Pangasinan, twenty leguas from where the Dutch were stationed. Being warned of the Dutch, the commander put into a port there, and with the help of the alcalde-mayor of that province they discharged the ship, removed the artillery, and fortified themselves with two hundred soldiers of the vessel, so that they could defend themselves if the Dutch heard of them. As quickly as possible they carried the silver and everything else to the city. The enemy [226]were advised of it, but at a time when everything was safe except the ship, which our men had to set afire, so that the enemy could not take it.

God was encouraging them in this way, and ordaining what was to be done; they appointed Master-of-camp Don Juan Ronquillo as commander, and he went immediately to the port to make effective the equipment of six galleons, for the others could not be made ready. Trustworthy persons were despatched in order that they might send what was necessary from the islands. In another direction, tests of the artillery were begun, and what burst was recast; and it all proved satisfactory, so that no piece turned out badly. All were encouraged—he who had means, to give what was needed, and all to go out to fight the enemy. The enemy, seeing that the season for the coming of the Chinese merchants had arrived, left the mouth of the bay, and went twenty leguas away to a port called Playa Honda, where all the Chinese ships come to make land, and where the other Dutchman who surrendered to Juan de Silva was pillaging in the year 1610. Thereupon, since the entrance of the bay was unoccupied, they sent for the almiranta, which had put in and had been unladed. It was brought to port, laden with the food that had been collected there for the purpose of being brought by the said ship if the enemy gave any opportunity for it, as they did. Everything resulted as we desired. The ship carried thirty pieces of artillery, with which they managed to equip it, for it did not have to be repaired. Seven galleons were made ready for sailing, and even the one that carried the least artillery numbered thirty large bronze pieces. Then captains and commanders were appointed for the [227]galleons, and each of the commanders was given the duty of directing and conveying the soldiers and inhabitants who were inclined to go with him; whereat each one labored to caress and attract not only his friends, but others also. The commanders were as follows: of the galleon “San Juan Bautista,” Admiral Pedro de Heredia; of the galleon “San Miguel,” Admiral Rodrigo de Vilastigui; of “San Felipe,” Captain Sebastian de Madrid; of “Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe,” Captain Juan Bautista de Molina; of “San Lorenço,” Captain Azevedo; and command of the galleon “San Marcos”—which was called the almiranta, as it had been with Don Juan de Silva in the expedition which he made to Malaca—was given to Don Juan de la Vega, son of Doctor Vega, auditor of the royal Audiencia. There were many disputes over his appointment as admiral, for many of the commanders to whom it was due claimed it, especially Don Diego Quiñones, who had been brought from Oton for that purpose, although he had not recovered from his musket-wound; also Hernando Muñoz de Aramburo (who had come as admiral of the caravels), and Francisco de la Serna—who had gone as commander of the ships, and at the restoration of the country was a very great soldier, who, with twenty gentlemen, served in that expedition at his own cost. Also for certain reasons, which I can not well recount, those captains were at odds, a mistake that caused much regret later, when there was no remedy. It is certain that no one would have escaped who would carry news of the enemy. Yet, so that it might not appear that they were shunning the opportunity, they offered their persons. Aramburu went as associate of the commander, being skilful [228]in war. Don Diego was given a galley and the title of quatralvo.11 Don Alonso Enriquez took another galley, with the title of commander [general]; Don Pedro de Almazan, another. The galleon “Salvador” was flagship, the best and largest galleon ever seen in the sea. It carried fifty large pieces of artillery, many of them of twenty-five and thirty libras’ caliber, but most of them of eighteen. The fleet left port on the eighth of April, in pursuit of the enemy. That afternoon, which was Saturday, it anchored at the mouth of the bay in order to ascertain the location of the enemy. They had heard already that the enemy had plundered many Chinese and had filled their ships with great riches. It was ascertained from a spy, who was the one who sent advices of what the enemy was doing, that two ships were six leguas from there, and the rest at Playa Honda. That report was false, and was the reason why the most fortunate victory that could be desired was not obtained without bloodshed, and without any one escaping, as will be seen in this relation. On receiving this news the commander began to trim his sails, in order to reach the two ships by dawn. But finding nothing, he passed on to Playa Honda, where he arrived late, more than two hours after the sun had risen. Had the spy not deceived them, they would have reached the four of the enemy’s ships at dawn, and the commander with most of his men could have slept on shore, entertaining guests with the booty that had fallen into his hands. But when they sighted our fleet, they were able to get aboard their vessels and to join the other two, which were coming with two more very rich Chinese prize ships. They [229]spread their sails and went away together, and the fleets did no more that day than to watch one another, but our fleet always kept very close to, and did not lose sight of, the enemy. Next morning, Friday, our fleet came up scattered, either because of their inability to follow the flagship, or through the fault of the pilots. What is the most certain thing is that faults are not investigated in the islands, nor are they punished. Because there was no almiranta to collect the vessels, the flagship, the “San Miguel,” and the “San Juan Bautista” were very near the enemy, while the others were more than three leguas to leeward. The enemy tried to improve the opportunity, and determined to grapple our flagship with all their fleet, which they had carefully collected—thinking that if it surrendered the war would be ended; for they thought that ship alone carried force, and that the others could only be carrying the pretense of it. The enemy worked to get to windward of our fleet, and our flagship, which was an excellent sailer, did the same; but on tacking, the latter threw a rope to the galley of Don Alonso Enriquez and towed it a short distance. That allowed the enemy time to get to windward, and they came down upon our fleet to attack it in the following order: their flagship came first and then the other vessels, the bow of one right against the stern of the other. Although they could have raked the “San Juan Bautista,” which was astern of the flagship, or have borne down upon the “San Miguel,” which lay to leeward, they cared only to defeat the flagship. Since our ships could not get to windward, they passed it very closely, each ship raking it. But our flagship was not asleep, and kept replying in such a way [230]that, although the enemy’s vessels came so close together, so great haste was made that it gave each ship a full broadside volley from that side, namely with twenty-five pieces. With that they were so crippled that they did not dare return the fire, and so gained nothing. That night the enemy held a council of war, as some prisoners reported. All advised flight, as they had been surprised by our flagship. But their commander assured them that there was nothing to fear, and that the flagship had all the force, and he dared to defeat it. Don Juan Ronquillo collected his fleet that night and sent an order by the galley of Don Diego de Quiñones for each vessel to grapple with the one that fell to its lot, and for the “San Lorenço” to act as a reserve in order to help the most needy. Next morning, Saturday, April 15, our fleet bore down upon the enemy and succeeded in getting to windward of it. Don Diego de Quiñones went with his galley to tell the commander that he was waiting to attack the enemy. The commander gave the same order, and also to leave the enemy’s flagship for him. Invoking our Lady of the most pure Conception, whom they had taken as patroness of that undertaking on their departure, they attacked the enemy. The Dutch were confident, when they were aware of the dash of the Spaniards, that our men would board their ships when they grappled. Accordingly they prepared for it by so many stratagems that all who boarded would be killed; but Don Juan Ronquillo, taking precautions against that, issued an order for no one to board until the galleon with which he was fighting had surrendered. That order was obeyed; and our flagship grappled its adversary, and although almost all the [231]latter’s crew were killed it refused to surrender. Finally it was reduced to such a condition that it began to roll violently, a sign that it was sinking, whereupon our flagship drew apart from it, and it went to the bottom. The commander and several who were left alive got into their small boat and escaped. It was said that the ship contained great wealth that had been pillaged along the coast of India, and the best that they had pillaged from the Chinese. That galleon was called “Sol Nuevo de Olanda” [i.e., “New Sun of Holland”], and it set very wretchedly for them that day. Captain Juan Bautista de Molina was the first to grapple another galleon, and the galley of Don Diego went to his aid. It had already surrendered, and the Dutch had been made prisoners, when another galleon, all on fire, bore down upon two galleons with which Rodrigo de Guillastegui had fought. It set fire to one of them, and it bore down ablaze upon the one defeated by Captain Molina, so that he was forced to ungrapple. Those two burning vessels bore down upon that of the Dutch admiral, with whom Pedro de Heredia had grappled, and whom he had already defeated and most of whose crew he had killed. When he saw the two burning galleons bearing down upon them, they threw off the grapples and separated. Consequently the admiral had opportunity to escape, but in so bad a condition that his vessel sank next day, according to the report of some Indians and Chinese who saw it. Captain Sebastian de Madrid, on going to grapple with another galleon, was killed by a musket-ball; and when his vessel was about to grapple, Don Juan de la Vega, with the galleon “San Marcos,” came between. Those [232]aboard the “San Felipe” thought that he would grapple, but he made for the open sea, whereupon they on seeing it went after him. Captain Azevedo grappled the other galleon, and after fighting gallantly, the grapples were thrown off, whereupon both Dutch galleons took the opportunity to escape. That battle was the most bloody ever seen, for all had come with the determination to die rather than surrender, and they did so. “San Felipe,” “San Juan Bautista,” and “San Marcos” went in pursuit of the three galleons of the enemy; but since flight has so many advantages to the one escaping, the enemy threw overboard all their cargo into that sea, and, their sails being wet, the sea became narrow for them, notwithstanding it was so wide; and when dark night came, they changed their route and our ships lost sight of them. Thereupon the “San Juan Bautista,” the “San Felipe,” and the “San Marcos” changed their course, and returned two days later for the evil result that disturbed that victory.

The commander determined to return to Manila, for their drinking-water was gone, and the galleon “San Miguel” was leaking badly, and they were unable to overcome the leak at the pumps, while the galleon of Pedro de Heredia arrived at the mouth of the bay in very bad condition. Next day two other galleons belonging to the enemy, which had not been present during the battle, reached the place where it had been fought. They had a Japanese prize-ship, laden with flour. Ignorant of the past event, they spied the “San Marcos” coming. One of them went to reconnoiter the latter, and upon seeing that it was our vessel went to advise its companion. Both bore down upon our vessel, whereupon it turned its course [233]to the shore. For reasons known to its commander—and I think because he was mainly influenced by cowardly advisers—the ship was run aground and burned, so near the enemy that the latter flung at them innumerable insults. The largest galleon of the fleet, next to the flagship, was lost. It had thirty-six large pieces of artillery, most of which have been taken out of it. The commander was arrested, as well as his associates Captains Pedro de Ermura and Salvador de Oñate. The most notable thing is that that galleon was lost on the very day of St. Mark, by whose intercession Don Juan de Silva had obtained the last victory.

Don Juan Ronquillo heard of the disaster of Don Juan de la Vega, and set out in pursuit of the enemy. He was unable, however, to overtake them, for a Dutch lad aboard the “San Marcos” escaped by swimming and went to the enemy, to whom he related what was happening. Thereupon the Dutch returned to Japon, laden with spoils.

Some have doubted whether the enemy had ten galleons, since only six fought, besides the two above mentioned, [and ask] what became of them. I answer that doubt by saying that one fled on the day of battle, and refused to fight, for which reason its captain was hanged at Maluco. The Dutch commander sent the other vessel back with the wounded and some sick men, as soon as the engagement with Don Diego de Quiñones had happened, chiefly because that galleon was leaking badly.

Captain Molina carried a carved image of our Lady in the galleon “Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe.” It was kept in a little wooden tabernacle. An eighteen-libra ball entered one of the ports, struck [234]the tabernacle of the image, and knocked it into a thousand splinters. I saw the latter and the ball with my own eyes. But the image remained on its base, and not a hair of it was touched, which was obviously a miracle.

Pedro de Heredia was carrying another picture of our Lady, painted on a board beside a crucifix, on the galleon “San Bautista.” Another ball of twelve libras entered and struck it on the breast, without doing it other harm than that the gold with which the drapery had been made stuck to the ball, which fell there at her feet, while the board was unbroken. I certify to that, for I saw it.

An artilleryman went below decks to apply fire to a piece with which he had fired several shots. He applied the fire to it three times, although on similar occasions it was wont to catch without that, but it would not go off. The artilleryman was surprised and approaching to ascertain what was the matter found the piece open. Had it taken fire, it would have caused a very great disaster, and perhaps have burned the ship. Whence one could clearly see that the Virgin, our Lady, was not slothful on that occasion. Neither was the city of Manila slothful, for they carried our Lady of Guidance, which is outside the walls, in solemn procession to the cathedral, whose advocacy is of the immaculate conception; and all the people confessed and took communion. Having exposed the most holy sacrament, all accompanied it during all those days, making many prayers to God and to His blessed mother, which were also answered. May He be blessed forever. Amen.[235]